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EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW AND
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT V. RODRIGUEZ
TIMOTHY E. GAMMON
INTRODUCTION
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez' a
class action was brought on behalf of certain Texas public school
students who lived in school districts which had a low property tax
base. The plaintiffs challenged the Texas school finance system as a
violation of equal protection requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment because the differences in assessable property among districts
caused substantial interdistrict disparities in tax burdens and per
pupil expenditures, favoring richer districts! The plaintiffs asserted
a right to equal educational opportunity, claiming that the amount
spent per pupil should be the same throughout the state and alleged
that the Texas school financing plan resulted in inequality since
more was being spent on students in richer districts even though
their parents were taxed at lower rates.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, applied
the rational relationship standard and upheld the Texas method of
public school finance, concluding that there was a reasonable rela-
tionship between the state educational obligations, the desire to
allow local school district autonomy, and the Texas finance system.'
The Court selected the rational basis standard because it used the
two-tier approach to the equal protection question and found that
neither fundamental interest nor suspect classifications were in-
volved.'
Under the two-tier approach state laws are evaluated in one of
two ways. Using the less critical rational basis standard a state need
only show some reasonable connection between the law and a legiti-
mate state interest. Under the more demanding strict scrutiny
standard a state must justify the law and demonstrate that state ob-
jectives can not be met by less restrictive measures. The key to
choosing which of the two standards under the two-tier approach is
to be employed is determined by whether a fundamental, constitu-
tionally protected interest is involved, or whether the statute
1. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
2. 411 U.S. at 5, 11-16.
3. 411 U.S. at 43, 50-54.
4. 411 U.S. at 25, 28, 33, 35.
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creates a discriminatory classification which is constitutionally im-
proper or suspect. The Supreme Court has employed the strict
scrutiny standard only if it first found either a fundamental interest
or suspect classification was involved.5
The critical issue in Rodriguez was whether a fundamental in-
terest was affected (education of the children) or whether a suspect
classification was created by the Texas statute (the discrimination
against both children and parents in poorer school districts). The
majority stated that fundamental rights must be implied or expressed
by specific constitutional guarantees, and although education is im-
portant it is not explicitly protected by the Constitution., After
reviewing considerable data on the wealth, tax bases, and per pupil
expenditures in Texas school districts, the majority further concluded
that evidence was lacking that the poor were concentrated in
districts with low tax bases and that no general correlation existed
between individual wealth and the per pupil tax expenditures.7 The
Court held that the residents in districts with a small tax base did
not need special protection against the normal workings of the
political process, thus departing from earlier cases which had ap-
plied strict scrutiny to wealth discrimination. These cases, however,
had involved complete deprivation of the petitioners' interests.
Rodriguez and the "contemporary compromise" mode of ad-
judication could be defended as representative of a consistent and
logical judicial approach which requires that a constitutionally pro-
tected interest be expressed or easily implied from the text of the
Constitution itself before they will be given special treatment.8 But
5. See notes 17, 31, and 32 infra and accompanying text.
6. 411 U.S. at 33, 35.
7. 411 U.S. at 26, 28.
8. Constitutional law and the way rights, liberties, or objectives are deter-
mined to be a part of the Constitution has involved three related dilemmas: first, the
dilemma of constitutional content or basis for constitutional rights and pronounce-
ments; second, the dilemma of constitutional law or form of constitutional rights and
pronouncements; and third, the dilemma of the judicial role, which is a product of the
first two. According to Professor Richard Parker of Harvard, the history of constitu-
tional law can be seen as a series of efforts by jurists to work out these dilemmas.
The efforts to rebuild constitutional doctrines following the impact of legal
realism included attempts in the 1950's and 1960's to totally eliminate judicial discre-
tion, which was done by abandoning perfect objectivity while simultaneously limiting
subjectivism by restricting the identification of constitutionally protected rights to
those listed in the Constitution, those inferable from the text of the Constitution, and
those which the framers of the Constitution could be said to have undoubtedly intend-
ed to include by implication because they are inextricably connected to certain
enumerated rights. This mode of adjudication-called the contemporary compromise-
has been characterized as being external to the Constitution but not transcendant;
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like earlier attempts to deal with the dilemmas of constitutional law
and the need for judicial objectivism, this mode of adjudication ap-
pears ludicrous when Rodriguez is contrasted with a decision like
Roe v. Wade.'
The Supreme Court's opinion in Rodriguez constitutes a failure
of judicial responsibility in adopting the rational basis standard as a
fair and impartially selected, unbiased tool for reaching a decision
when the actual purpose of the court was to buttress a predeter-
mined judgment."0 Selection of an equal protection standard of
changing or mutable; not limited to that which is discoverable from the text of the
Constitution alone but rather inferable from the intentions of those who wrote the
Constitution; and distinguishable from legal realism by the way constitutional values
are sought.
For discussion and debate over these aspects of the contemporary com-
promise, particularly the issue of what sources can be considered in drawing in-
ferences that constitutional rights not enumerated are nevertheless protected by im-
plication, see, e.g., J. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973); P. Heyman & D. Bradley, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v.
Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973); E. Michleman, In Pursuit of Constitu-
tional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawl's Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962
(1973); L. Tribe, Forward& Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe the Court held state laws prohibiting abortion,
at least during the earlier stages of pregnancy were unconstitutional. The Court iden-
tified this right to an abortion as fundamental and protected by the Constitution. If the
inference of constitutional rights had been limited in Roe as they were in Rodriguez to
a specific constitutional provision, the state statute in Roe should have been upheld.
See J. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973); contra, P. Heyman & D. Bradley, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and
Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973).
10. The judgment is determined not by application of either the strict
scrutiny or rational basis test under the two-tier approach, but by selection of the test
to be used. The problem is that it cannot be predicted from established legal
precedents and the particular circumstances which test the court will use. Rather the
selection of the test actually depends on the characterization of the circumstances by
the court, whether interests are labeled fundamental or classifications identified as
suspect, instead of their actual nature. Because a particular judgment is assured by
the test chosen, e.g. using the rational basis test in Rodriguez rather than strict
scrutiny, or using due process in Roe v. Wade rather than equal protection, which
meant the interest of petitioner in Roe could be inferred from more general constitu-
tional provisions which would not be possible under the two-tier approach in which
fundamental interests must be clearly implied by more specific constitutional provi-
sions, the trier of fact can manipulate the factors that determine which test will be
chosen. Compare San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
The most obvious historical analogy to this process of adjudication would be
the ancient English trial by ordeal, in which various tests were given to an individual
accused of a crime to determine the individual's guilt or innocence. For example, burn-
ing coals would be placed in his hand and the hand would be bound; if when the hand
was unwrapped the wound was festered or infected the individual would be deemed to
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review in Rodriguez and other recent decisions has become a judg-
ment in itself or more often a means of justifying a preconceived
judgment, rather than a process used to evaluate all the evidence
and reach a decision on the merits. A judgment is rendered usually
on the basis of the personal prejudices, fears, or political beliefs of
the Court and then the corresponding standard of review is identi-
fied and its use in the particular case is rationalized." Specifically, in
Rodriguez the Court marshalled and contorted precedents 2 to prove
that education was not a fundamental interest and that wealth
discrimination did not create a suspect classification. This permitted
application of the less demanding rational basis standard. Analysis
of the two-tier approach in equal protection cases and the specific
alternatives to the pernicious treatment of the equal protection
issue in Rodriguez"5 supports the thesis that under equal protection
have been judged guilty and he would be punished. Selection of the specific ordeal and
its administration was normally left to the clergy, who could assure a particular out-
come either by selection of a particular test or the manner in which the test was
given. The clergy could and often did insure the right result by choosing the ordeal or
application of the ordeal in a particular manner. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 114-15 (5th ed., 1956).
11. The personal beliefs and philosophies of jurists have influenced their
judicial temperament, and the course of American constitutional history. The initial
assertion of supreme judicial power and autonomy in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), can more easily be explained by the political philosophy of Chief
Justice John Marshall than by examination of the bare text of the Constitution. Those
members of the Supreme Court appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt were
picked, in part, because of their political philosophy and since that time many appoint-
ments would appear to have been made primarily on that basis.
The instant case serves as an excellent example. Despite the elusiveness and
generalization of labels, few would deny that the more liberal members of the Supreme
Court during the 1972 term were Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, or that the
more conservative members of the court were Justices Blackman, Powell, Rehnquist,
and Chief Justice Berger. In Rodriguez every member of the former, more liberal
group dissented while every member of the more conservative faction were numbered
among the majority. Rodriguez was not the only decision during the 1972 term in
which the majority and minority were aligned along the same liberal-conservative
lines. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412
U.S. 17 (1973); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Davis v. United States, 411
U.S. 233 (1973); Lemon v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 192 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S.
656, petition for rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 922 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
922 (1973).
12. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffen v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
13. The history, development, and proposed changes in equal protection stand-
ards of review have been analyzed extensively. See, e.g., Brest, The Conscientious
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1977], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss3/5
1977] SAN ANTONIO
the Court could have upheld the plaintiffs' claims that denying equal
educational opportunity based on interdistrict wealth discrepancies
involved a suspect classification touching upon a fundamental in-
terest, either education or equal educational opportunity.
THE RODRIGUEZ DECISION
The Supreme Court, in upholding the Texas school finance
structure, reversed the ruling of a three judge federal district court
which had recommended application of the principle of "fiscal
neutrality. 14 The lower court had held first, that the state had not
explained why acts of other governmental units should excuse the
state from its obligations or the consequences of state law and sec-
ond, that supplementary federal funds were not intended to compen-
sate for the inequalities produced by state districting. 5 Thus the
Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975);
Dorsen, Equal Protection of the Laws, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 357 (1974) (discussing justice,
equal protection, and Justice Marshall's spectrum analysis); Goodpaster, The Constitu-
tion and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 479 (1973) (advocating implementation
of an intermediate standard); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward' In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Karst, Invidious Discrimination Justice Douglas
and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 716
(1969); Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 629 (1970);
Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-
Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974) (discuss-
ing new standards); Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27
STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974); Tushnet, '. . . And Only Wealth Will Buy You Justice"-
Some Notes on the Supreme Court. 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 177; Tussman & ten
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949); Wilkinson, The
Supreme Court the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975); Yackel, Thoughts on Rodriguez: Mr. Justice
Powell and the Demise of Equal Protection Analysis in the Supreme Court. 9 U. RICH.
L. REV. 181 (1975); Symposium, Equal Protection, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 941 (1968); Note,
Borass v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MICH. L. REV.
508 (1974); Comment, Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny:
From Rodriguez to Lafleur, 62 GEO. L.J. 1173 (1974); Comment, The Evolution of
Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Services and Wealth, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 105 (1972). See also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Developments). See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM.
AND AMERICAN LAW 242-57 (1973); T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1967); 2 P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M.
HOWE, & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 1071-1141 (3d
ed. 1967); P. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 694-799 (4th ed.
1972); J. TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965).
14. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 337 F. Supp. 280,
282 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
15. Id
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state was free to adopt any financial system it wanted provided the
variations in wealth of governmentally created units did not affect
the amount spent on educating any child. The court indicated it
would itself enforce this principle of "fiscal neutrality."1
In a five-to-four decision consisting of the Nixon appointees and
Justice Stewart in the majority, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the system favored more affluent school districts but held that
the Constitution does not require "absolute equality or precisely
equal advantages," concluding "some inequality in the manner in
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a sufficient basis
for striking down the entire system. 1 7
The majority approach to the case was first to decide what
standard of equal protection review was to be used in analyzing the
Texas school financing scheme and then to evaluate the financing
scheme under the selected judicial standard.18 Following the estab-
lished two-tier bifurcation, the Court had to select a judicial stand-
ard of review from between two diametrically opposed alternatives. 9
The more demanding "strict scrutiny" standard would only have
been utilized if it had been determined that either a suspect
classification or fundamental interest was involved.
The tone of the Court was set by its pronouncement that the
wealth discrimination struck down by lower courts in school finance
16. 337 F. Supp. at 284. On the power of courts to enforce equalization of ex-
penditures, see Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971); Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1969), further relief granted, 320 F. Supp. 409 (D.D.C. 1970) (desegregation order).
The 1971 Hobson case involved the problem of intradistrict disparities in ex-
penditures. Judge Wright ordered the school board to bring its per pupil expenditures
for teachers' salaries and benefits at each school to within five percent of the system-
wide average. Despite the close relation of the issues in Hobson to those in this article
further discussion is beyond the scope of this article. For a history and analysis of the
litigation, see Hornby & Holmes, Equalization of Resources Within School Districts, in
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF SCHOOL FINANCE 93 (K. Alexander & K. Jordan eds. 1973);
Kirp, The Poor, the Schools and Equal Protection, in EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNI-
TY 134, 140 (1969).
17. Id at 51.
18. Id at 17. While the majority limited the issue before it to the constitu-
tionality of the Texas school financing structure under the appropriate fourteenth
amendment equal protection standard, the majority's subsequent analysis and develop-
ment of that issue included references to the input/output debate, the effect that affir-
ming the lower court decision would have on property taxes and the provision of other
governmental services, and problems in implementing an affirmance of the lower court
decision and a court administered financing scheme if the legislature refused to act.
19. The equal protection standards of review are discussed in the following
section.
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cases was "quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination
heretofore reviewed by this Court."'' The Court maintained there
was "no definitive description of the classifying facts or delineation
of the disfavored class."2 Nevertheless, it identified one possible
basis for describing the class disadvantaged by the Texas school
financing system that could arguably have met the criteria estab-
lished by case precedent-discrimination against those with income
below a poverty level.' This, however, was apparently only a straw
man. The Court hastened to conclude there was an absence of
evidence that the system classified or discriminated against an iden-
tifiable category of poor people or resulted in absolute deprivation
of education. 2' By analyzing and distinguishing prior wealth classi-
fication cases the Court was able to concede some correlation bet-
ween wealth, property tax base, and student expenditures in certain
districts while holding "the Texas system does not operate to the
disadvantage of any suspect class. 2
'
20. Id. at 18-19.
21. Id. at 19-20. The Court pointed out this led to uncertainty. The financing
system might be regarded as discriminating against persons whose incomes fall below
some identifiable poverty level, those who are relatively poorer than others or those
who, irrespective of their individual income, live in relatively poorer school districts. The
Court proceeded to consider whether there was discrimination on the basis of any one
of the three and whether the resulting classification would be suspect. Id. at 20.
22. Id. at 22. The Court stated that the individuals who constituted suspect
classes in prior cases had shared two distinguishing characteristics. First, they were
totally unable to pay for some desired benefit because of their impecunity. Second,
they consequently sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to en-
joy that benefit. Id at 20-22. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Tate v. Short,
401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963); Griffen v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
23. 411 U.S. at 22-25. The Court citing a Connecticut study held, "there is
reason to believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest
property districts." Id. at 23-24. See Davis, Taxpaying Ability: A Study of the Rela-
tionship Between Wealth and Income in California Counties, in NATIONAL EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON EDUCATIONAL FINANCE, THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE IN
SCHOOL FINANCE, 10TH N.E.A. CONFERENCE ON SCHOOL FINANCE 199 (1967); Note, A
Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Loosing
Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1328-29 (1972).
The Court further implied it would not act absent a total deprivation of educa-
tion because there were so many variables effecting the educational process and the
controvesy over whether expenditures were related to educational quality was
unresolved. 411 U.S. at 24.
24. Id. at 29. The Court denied any universal correlation between wealth and
property tax base per pupil. The weakness of the Court's analysis seems evident in its
following summary:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of
the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treat-
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The majority, which declined to intrude into state educational
policies, concluded the disparities produced by the local property
tax system were not clear-cut enough to require judicial second
guessing of the way tax revenues are raised and distributed within
the states. This conclusion was reached despite statistics showing
variations from $5,960 to $49,000 in local assessed valuation per stu-
dent and variations from $26 to $333 in locally retained contribu-
tions to per student expenditures among school districts in Texas. 5
Similarly, the Court acknowledged the societal importance of
education," but distinguished the circumstances in the case before it
from those in previous cases in which the Court had recognized that
education was a fundamental interest." In the instant case education
was not considered a fundamental interest because "social impor-
tance is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation
to strict scrutiny."28 A specific interest was fundamental only if
ment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
Id. at 28. See Note, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: A Study of
Alternatives Open to State Courts, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 90, 111, where it is noted the
Court did not say poverty could not be a suspect class, but merely that the classes
petitioners presented for consideration were not acceptable.
25. Id. at 12-13. These figures were supported by the affidavit of Professor
Berke and his study of 110 Texas school districts demonstrating a direct correlation
between the amount of a district's taxable property and its level of per pupil expen-
ditures. Id. at 15 n.38. See also Id. at 134, 135, 137 (appendices).
Justice Powell stated that insofar as the correlations of Professor Berke were
relevant to the constitutional thesis presented in the instant case the Court might ac-
cept its basic thrust, but he did identify an article questioning the affiant's
methodology and he noted the study established only a partial correlation between a
district's median family income and per pupil expenditures. I at 15 n.38.
26. The Court cited this well-known passage in Brown:
• .. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an op-
portunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms.
411 U.S. at 29-30 (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 237-39 (1972); Abington School District v.
Schemmpp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963); Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); International Consolidated Street Ry. v. Massachusetts,
207 U.S. 79 (1907).
27. 411 U.S. at 32. Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), with
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
The Court invoked strict scrutiny in Shapiro because a constitutionally recognized fun-
damental interest was shown but the Court rejected strict scrutiny in the latter two
cases because such interests were not shown.
28. 411 U.S. at 32.
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there existed an explicitly or implicitly guaranteed right under the
Constitution pertaining to that interest.' Since education clearly is
not an expressly guaranteed Constitutional right, the question was
thus narrowed to whether education was guaranteed by implication.
The majority presented the question as should the Court adopt
the "nexus" theory of appellees? Education, according to the
"nexus" theory, would be a fundamental right because education is
so closely tied to other rights and liberties, particularly the effective
exercise of the first amendment freedoms and the right to vote.w
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, recalled that the Supreme
Court in Brown had described education as perhaps the most impor-
tant function of state and local governments, but also stated, "It is
not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteed equal protection under law.""1 The
majority thus paid homage to Brown and the fundamental impor-
tance of education while refusing to apply or extend the philosophy
presented in Brown. This inconsistency between Brown and Rod-
riguez is shown by the statement of Justice Powell in Rodriguez
that the Supreme Court does not consider the right to education to
be among the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and
thus the Court need not apply the strict judicial scrutiny to this
area that it has to others-as where it ruled that citizens have a
constitutionally protected right to vote on an equal basis.2
The Court suggested that the case before it was not one involv-
ing total deprivation similar to that previously presented to the
Court in the speech and voting rights cases.' It concluded that the
29. Id. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
30. 411 U.S. at 35.
31. Id. at 33. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
32. 411 U.S. at 33.
33. Id. at 36. The Court indicated that rather than being asked to follow the
speech and voting cases it thought it was being asked to break new and dangerous
ground by guaranteeing the quality of the right, in this instance education, when there
were innumerable variables affecting quality:
The Court has long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable
governmental interference with the individual's right to speak and to
vote. Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the
authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the
most informed electoral choice.
Id. Similar to its approach to the problem of identifying wealth as a suspect classifica-
tion, the Court recited the difficulty in singling out education from the myriad of per-
sonal interests and the possible effect on the provision of other governmental services
that affirming the decision of the lower federal court decision would have. Id. at 37.
1977]
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current Texas scheme had been implemented in an effort to extend
public education and improve its quality.' The Court added that
even if an identifiable quantum of education were required the ap-
pellees had presented no facts from which the Court could conclude
that the present system failed to provide that quantum.3
Having found neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental
interest, the Court declared that the Texas educational financing
system must be evaluated by the less demanding "rational relation-
ship" standard, where the state has only to show some rational basis
for the challenged legislation.' Describing the contours of the Texas
school financing system in considerable detail the Court identified
local control of education as the rational basis for maintaining the
present system.3 7 The Court reasoned first, that loss of local control
would follow if a different financing system were used, especially
one that increased state financing responsibility, and second, that
the local property tax was a valid means of providing for local
34. Id. at 38-39. The Court relied on a 1966 decision in which it had concluded
that reform legislation need not cover all ills and reform legislation would not be view-
ed as legislation denying fundamental rights simply because it did not provide univer-
sal relief. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In Katzenbach the Court noted:
Every step leading to the establishment of the system Texas utilizes
today-including the decisions permitting localities to tax and spend local-
ly, and creating and continuously expanding state aid-was implemented
in an effort to extend public education and to improve its quality. Of
course every reform that benefits some more than others may be criti-
cized for what it fails to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in
substance, the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory
and, therefore, should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to
the nature of the State's efforts and to the rights reserved to the States
under the Constitution.
411 U.S. at 39 (quoting Katzenbach v. Moore at 656-57).
35. 411 U.S. at 36-37.
36. Id. at 40. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart approved of the Stan-
dard of review chosen by the Court:
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court because I am convinced that
any other course would mark an extraordinary departure from principled
adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring).
37. Idc at 49-55. The Court traced the power to tax local property for educa-
tion which has existed in Texas at least since 1883, the implementation of the "founda-
tion program" theory in the 1920's which assured a guaranteed level of education, and
the different sources of basic and equalizing educational revenue. Holding that the
Texas plan "abundantly satisfied" the traditional rational basis standard, the Court
praised the state and extolled the virtues it saw in the Texas financing system:
While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it [the
Texas school financing system] permits and encourages a large measure
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autonomy over education." An additional justification given by the
Court for approving the property tax scheme was the importance of
local property tax in the provision of other governmental services
and the implications invalidating local property taxation for educa-
tion would have on financing those services. 9
of participation in and control of each district's schools at the local level.
In an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward centralization of
the functions of government, local sharing of responsibility for public
education has survived. The merit of local control was recognized last
Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v. Council of
the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
Id. at 49.
48. Id at 50-51. On the first point, the language of Justice Powell was more
equivocal than the holding:
The people of Texas may be justified in believing that other systems of
school financing, which place more of the financial responsibility in the
hands of the State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired local
autonomy. That is, they may believe that along with increased control of
the purse strings at the state level will go increased control over local
policies.
Id. at 51-53.
On the second issue, the validity of local property tax, Justice Marshall charged
in dissent that the issue was raised unnecessarily by the Court not the litigants:
[W]e are told that the case requires us "to condemn the State's judgment
in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to
supply revenues for local interests." Yet no one in the course of this en-
tire litigation has ever questioned the constitutionality of the local prop-
erty tax as a devise for raising educational funds. The District Court's
decision, at most restricts the power of the State to make educational fund-
ing dependent exclusively upon local property taxation so long as there
exists interdistrict disparities in taxable property wealth. But it hardly
eliminates the local property tax as a source of educational funding or as
a means of providing local fiscal control.
Id. at 132 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. The majority stated:
[T]he Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny
lest all local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism under the Equal
Protection Clause.
Id. at 41. The Court subsequently elaborated upon the consequences of failing to heed
that admonition:
[If local taxation for local expenditures were an unconstitutional method
of providing for education then it might be an equally impermissable
means of providing other necessary services customarily financed largely
from local property taxes, including local police and fire protection, public
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We
perceive no justification for such a severe denigration of local property
taxation and control as would follow from appellees' contentions.
Id. at 54. Justice Powell concluded the Court had never had the power to invalidate
state financing plans simply because the burdens or benefits of the plans fell unevenly
on individuals due to the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which they lived.
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Those cases invalidating school finance systems were criticized
by the Court for their constitutional views and their assumptions
regarding gains likely to be recognized by minority students, poor
students, and large cities if the present systems were invalidated."0
Admitting taxable wealth disparities exist and even acknowledging
that tax systems too heavily dependent on local property tax need
reforming, the Court nevertheless proclaimed: "The ultimate solu-
tions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pres-
sures of those who elect them.""
Justice Marshall, in a lengthy dissent, presented data and
cogent arguments in support of the lower court's disposition of the
case. 2 He felt the question of legal protection was adequately raised
by the disparities shown: total deprivation of education should not
be required. He thereby highlighted the inappropriateness of the
rigid, traditional rational basis standard. 3 In its analysis the Court
40. Id at 55. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 337
F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1971).
One commentator has questioned whether Rodriguez was really a limitation on
Serrano, noting, "What is constitutionally forbidden in California, Rodriguez notwith-
standing, is the substantial wealth-based inequality in school spending that persists
under the 1972 Act." Karst, California-Serrano v. Priest's Inputs and Outputs, 38
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 333, 349 (1974). See also Grubb, The First Round of
Legislative Reforms in the Post-Serrano World, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 457 (1974).
41. 411 U.S. at 49-50, 53-55, 58-59. The determination that solutions to ine-
qualities in school financing should be left to the state legislature was echoed in the
tone of Justice Powell's opinion. He repeatedly expressed a reluctance to act based on
lack of expertise. d. at 41-43.
42. Id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan supported the recogni-
tion of education as a fundamental interest based on the nexus theory: "[Elducation is
inextricably linked to the right to participate in the electoral process and to the rights
of free speech and association." Id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice White stated the disparities were not inconsequential when two
separate districts in the same county would have to tax at the rates of $.68 per hun-
dred dollars of assessed valuation and $5.76 per hundred dollars of assessed valuation
respectively in order for both to equal the highest per pupil yield of any district in the
same county. Id. at 63-70 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas concurred in the dissenting opinions of Justices Marshall and
White.
43. Justice Marshall noted:
The Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to the minimal sufficiency
but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state action. It mandates
nothing less than that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike."
... In my view, then, it is inequality-not some notion of gross in-
adequacy-of educational opportunity that raises a question of denial of
equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 89, 90. Justice Marshall also maintained that education was a fundamental in-
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had not previously restricted its choice to the two standards under
the two-tier approach but had instead applied a spectrum of stand-
ards varying according to the basis of the classifications involved,
the relative constitutional and societal significance of the interest
adversely affected, and the available legislative alternatives in
limiting or structuring the particular actions or processes." By com-
bining his criticism of the majority's resort to the rational basis
standard with identification of the spectrum or sliding scale ap-
proach, Justice Marshall presented a meaningful alternative ap-
proach to the equal protection cases." But Justice Marshall made it
terest, based both on the nexus theory and the language of previous Supreme Court
cases showing the Court had considered education a favored interest in the past. Id.
See cases cited note 26 supra.
44. 411 U.S. at 98-110. See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
45. Marshall stated:
[Ilt seems to me inescapably clear that this Court has consistently ad-
justed the care with which it will review state discrimintion in light of the
constitutional significance of the interests affected and the invidiousness
of the particular classification. In the context of economic interests, we
find that discriminatory state action is almost always sustained, for such
interests are generally far removed from constitutional guarantees ...
But the situation differs markedly when discrimination against particular-
ly disadvantaged or powerless classes is involved ...
Nevertheless, the majority today attempts to force this case into
the same category for purposes of equal protection analysis as decisions
involving discrimination affecting commercial interests. By so doing, the
majority singles this case out for analytic treatment at odds with what
seems to me to be the clear trend of recent decisions in this Court, and
thereby ignores the constitutional importance of the interest at stake and
the invidiousness of the particular classification, factors that call for far
more than the lenient scrutiny of the Texas financing scheme which the
majority pursues.
411 U.S. at 109-10.
As an example of how the scale slides in evaluating wealth classifications to in-
crease the state's burden to show a compelling interest as more important rights or in-
terests are involved, Justice Marshall cited Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966), noting:
While the "poor" have frequently been a legally disadvantaged group, it
cannot be ignored that social legislation must frequently take cognizance
of the economic status of our citizens. Thus, we have generally gauged
the invidiousness of wealth classifications with an awareness of the impor-
tance of the interests being affected and the relevance of personal wealth
to those interests.
411 U.S. at 121-22.
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clear that if the only choice were between strict scrutiny and the ra-
tional basis standard he would choose the former in the instant case
because in his opinion education is a fundamental interest and the
Texas financing system unreasonably classified and discriminated on
the basis of wealth.4
6
Justice Marshall assailed the reasoning of the majority on
several other crucial points. First, he challenged the Court's dis-
missal of admitted disparities by attributing to Texas an effective
and ongoing plan to remove the disparities. 7 Second, he agreed with
In further defense of his spectrum approach Justice Marshall noted there were
greater problems with determining the minimum education the majority indicated it
would require. Id
46. Justice Marshall argued:
[T]he fundamental importance of education is amply indicated by the prior
decisions of this Court, by the unique status accorded public education by
our society, and by the close relationship between education and some of
our most basic constitutional values.
Id at 111. See cases cited note 26 supra. See also Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (1938).
Justice Marshall, unlike the majority, had no trouble identifying the
discriminated class:
In light of the data introduced before the District Court, the conclusion
that the school children of property poor districts constitute a sufficient
class for our purposes seems indisputable to me ...
* * [Hiaving established public education for its citizens, the State,
as a direct consequence of the variations in local property wealth endemic
to Texas' financing scheme, has provided some Texas school children with
substantially less resources for their education than others. Thus, while
on its face the Texas scheme may merely discriminate between local
districts, the impact of that discrimination falls directly upon the children
whose educational opportunity is dependent upon where they happen to
live. Consequently, the District Court correctly concluded that the Texas
financing scheme discriminates, from a constitutional perspective, be-
tween school age children on the basis of the amount of taxable property
located within their local districts. ...
' * * I do not believe that a clearer definition of either the disad-
vantaged class of Texas school children or the allegedly unconstitutional
discrimination suffered by the members of that class under the present
Texas financing scheme could be asked for, much less needed.
411 U.S. at 91, 92, 97.
47. In his dissent, Marshall stated:
[Ilnstead of closely examining the seriousness of these disparities and the
invidiousness of the Texas financing scheme, the Court undertakes an
elaborate exploration of the efforts Texas has purportedly made to close
the gaps between its districts in terms of levels of district wealth and
resulting educational funding. Yet, however praiseworthy Texas' equaliz-
ing efforts, the issue in this case is not whether Texas is doing its best to
ameliorate the worst features of a discriminatory scheme, but rather
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the majority that courts should not resolve disputes over educa-
tional theory and the input/output debate, but he disagreed such
disputes were relevant, stating the standard of measurement should
be the opportunity provided not the use made of that opportunity.48
Third, he contended use of the sliding scale standard would produce
a fairer and more predictable decision, with less chance of the deci-
sion supporting an accusation that the Court was legislating, than
would the Court's reversal of the district court on the ground that
Texas had provided some undefined minimum quantum of educa-
tion. 9 Finally, he questioned the Court's assertions that the present
system provided local control and that invalidating the present
system would reduce, if not destroy local control. 0
whether the scheme itself is in fact unconstitutionally discriminatory in
the face of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of
the laws.
Id. at 72.
48. Marshall noted:
[Tlhe question of discrimination in educational quality must be deemed to
be an objective one that looks to what the State provides its children, not
to what the children are able to do with what they receive. That a child
forced to attend an underfunded school with a narrower range of courses
than a school with substantially more funds-and thus with greater
choice in educational planning-may nevertheless excel is to the credit of
the child, not the State. . . . Indeed, who can ever measure for such a
child the opportunities lost and the talents wasted for want of a broader,
more enriched education?
Id at 84.
49. In propounding the utilization of the sliding scale standard Marshall con-
tended:
A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has ap-
plied a spectrum of standard in reviewing discrimination allegedly
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly com-
prehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will
scritinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitu-
tional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classifica-
tion is drawn. I find in fact that many of the Court's recent decisions em-
body the very sort of reasoned approach to equal protection analysis for
which I previously argued-that is an approach in which "concentration
(is) placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to the individuals in the class discriminated against of the
governmental benefits they do not receive, and the asserted state in-
terests in support of the classification."
Id. at 98-99; accord, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (dissenting opi-
nion).
50. While Justice Marshall admitted local control of public education con-
stituted a substantial state interest, he stated that the record in the instant case
established "the State's purported concern with local control is offered primarily as an
excuse rather than a justification for interdistrict inequality." 411 U.S. at 126. He ex-
plained the failure of the present system to provide local control.
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THE DOCTRINE: THE TWO-TIER APPROACH TO EQUAL PROTECTION
The Supreme Court has utilized two separate tests in assessing
the constitutionality of challenged state legislative classifications
under the equal protection clause."l Legislative classifications dis-
criminate by grouping particular individuals for specific reasons
whether by design or consequence. Legislative classifications may
discriminate against age groups by limiting drivers' licenses to
those over sixteen or requiring every child under fourteen to be in
school; against groups lacking certain educational degrees by not
allowing individuals who lack law or medical degrees from certain
accredited colleges to take the bar or medical examination or to
practice law or medicine; against groups based on their income by
denying welfare benefits to those with income above a specified
limit or requiring a percentage of income to be payed as income tax
only from those making above a certain level; or against other
groups by denying convicted felons the right to hold office or vote.
If Texas had a system truly dedicated to local fiscal control one would ex-
pect the quality of the educational opportunity provided in each district to
vary with the decision of the voters in that district as to the level of
sacrifice they wish to make for public education. ... [But] local school
school districts cannot choose to have the best education in the State by
imposing the highest tax rate. Instead, the quality of the educational op-
portunity offered by any particular district is largely determined by the
amount of taxable property located in the district-a factor over which
local voters can exercise no control.
Id. at 127-28. He added local control could better be provided by other financing plans.
[A]ppellees have pointed out a variety of alternative financing schemes
which may well serve the State's purported interest in local control as
well, if not better, than the present scheme without the current impair-
ment of the educational opportunity of vast numbers of Texas school
children.
Id at 129.
Justice Marshall maintained the district courL decision only affected local con-
trol as it was related to raising school funds and the continued interdistrict wealth
discrimination inherent in the present property tax. He contended the district court
decision did not require centralized decision making, federal intervention in the opera-
tion of public schools, or implementation of a particular centralized or decentralized
plan from among the proposed plans that would eliminate interdistrict discrimination:
[A]ffirmance of the District Court's decision would hardly sound the death
knell for local control of education ...
Nor does the District Court's decision even necessarily eliminate
local control of educational funding.
Id. at 130. See also Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a
Moral Theory f Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32, 64-67 (1973).
51. See Developments, supra note 13, at 1076. Contra, Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (no solid basis for the doctrine of two
equal protection standards to assess legislative classifications).
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The traditional test to determine whether a statutory classification
conflicted with the equal protection clause, developed over the six
decades following the Civil War, presumed the constitutionality of
the statute. Although in theory the state had to show the statute
was rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective,52 in
practice this presumption of constitutionality usually meant only a
minimal requirement that the legislative classification not be patent-
ly irrational and the burden of proof was on the individual challeng-
ing the statute.5"
52. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 578 (1938);
F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). In a 1911 decision the
Court stated:
The contention is made that ... [the statute which the petitioner-company
seeks to attack] is arbitrary in its classification, and consequently denies
the equal protection of the laws to those whom it affects. The rules by
which this contention must be tested, as is shown by repeated decisions of
this court, are these: 1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the
adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of
discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without
any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification
having some reasonable basis does not offend against the clause merely
because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it
results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called
in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a
law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-80 (1911). See also Dykstra,
Legislative Favoritism Before the Courts, 5 IID. L.J. 38 (1951); Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893);
Warsoff, The Weight of the Presumption of Constitutionality Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 18 B.U.L. REV. 319 (1938); Willis, Due Process of Law Under the United
States Constitution, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 331 (1926); Yackel, supra note 13.
53. The general practice, when the traditional rational-basis test has been
used, has been one of "investigating legislation with a presumption of constitutionality
and requiring merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some ra-
tional relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose." Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2
Cal. 3d 765, 784, 471 P.2d 487, 500, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852 (1970), vacated on other
grounds, 403 U.S. 915 (1971); Comment, Equality and the Schools: Education as a
Fundamental Interest 21 AM. U.L. REV. 716, 718 (1972).
The equal protection clause was first construed in the Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (Wall.) 36, 81 (1873), but it was not until Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel William-
son, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), that a state was required to show a compelling govern-
mental interest. Ruvoldt, Educational Financing in New Jersey, Robinson v. Cahill
and Beyond, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 12 (1973).
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The Supreme Court subsequently found the traditional test failed
to protect adequately the individual rights and liberties conferred
by or inferred from the Constitution because it was too difficult for
those challenging state legislation to overcome the presumption that
the legislation was constitutional. Thus a second standard of review
was formulated. 4 The state under this second tier of review had to
show first, that a compelling governmental interest justified the
legislation, although no precise formula was given for distinguishing
compelling state interests from other state interests, and second,
that the distinctions drawn by the classification were requisite to ac-
complishing the legislative intentions.5" Specifically, the state had to
prove that less discriminating alternatives would not achieve the ex-
pressed legislative purpose and that the classification was neither
"overbroad nor underinclusive. ' 5' The Court has employed this com-
pelling interest test only after having determined there was either a
suspect classification 7 or a fundamental interest' that justified
54. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S! 618, 658 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 118 (1969); Note, Residency Requirements, 53
MARQ. L. REV. 439 (1970); Comment, Residency Requirements Constitute an Invidious
Discrimination Denying Applicants Equal Protection of the Laws, Violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Place a "Chilling Effect" on the Right of
Interstate Travel, 1 ST. MARY'S L.J. 268 (1969). See also Areen & Ross, The Rodriguez
Case: Judicial Oversight, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 33 (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
was the first equal protection case under the new approach requiring that the govern-
ment show a compelling interest.)
55. Hall v. Beals, 369 U.S. 45, 52 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing
establishment of the dual aspect of the strict scrutiny standard); Comment, supra note
54, at 718 n.18.
56. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). One commentator has noted:
Strict scrutiny therefore requires familiar judicial balancing: the court
must weigh benefits accuring to society if the classification is sustained
against [the] importance of the individual or group rights infringed and
long term adverse affects on those interests.
Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Services and
Wealth, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 113 (1972).
57. The terminology "suspect classification" was first employed in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See Lusky, Minority
Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1 (1942); Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 979.
For cases on discriminatory classifications based on race and alienage, see
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 663 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd sub
nom. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Concerning the suspect classification of the Japanese and their relocation, dur-
ing World War II, see Alexandre, The Nisei-A Casuality of World War I, 28 COR
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subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny. 9 When laws restrict con-
stitutional freedoms or classify and discriminate against groups on
NELL L.Q. 385 (1943); Freeman, Genesis, Exodus and Leviticus-Genealogy, Evacua-
tion and Law, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 414 (1943); Rostow, Japanese-American Cases-A
Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945); Wolfson, Legal Doctrine, War Power, and Japanese
Evacuation, 32 Ky. L.J. 328 (1944); Comment, Constitutional Aspects of War Reloca-
tion Authority and Japanese Americans, 11 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482 (1943); Comment,
Civil Rights and Anti-Japanese Discrimination, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1949).
For a discussion of classification according the race and the unconstitutionality
of anti-miscegenation statutes, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Avins, Anti-
Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L.
REV. 1224 (1966); Riley, Miscegenation Statutes-A Reevaluation of Their Constitu-
tionality in Light of Changing Social and Political Conditions, 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 28
(1958); Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes,
42 CORNELL L.Q. 208 (1957).
58. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (recog-
nizing a fundamental right to vote without paying poll tax); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956) (requiring the state provide indigent criminals a right of appeal).
For discussion of Harper, see The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 124 (1966); Note, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection-State Poll Tax
Prerequisite to Voting-Denial of Equal Protection 16 AM. U.L. REV. 128 (1966);
Note, Poll Tax-Violative of Equal Protection 28 OHIO ST. L. REV. 189 (1967); Note, The
Poll Tax, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161 (1966). See also U.S. Const. amend. XXIV
(eliminating the poll tax in federal elections).
For additional cases and articles dealing with the issues presented in Griffin,
see Gardnes v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192
(1966); Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 151
(1957); Note, Failure to Provide Transcript Without Cost to Indigent Defendants
Violates Equal Protection Clause, 34 TEX. L. REV. 1083 (1956); Comment, Due Process
and Equal Protection. Right of an Indigent Defendant to a Transcript of the Trial 4
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 274 (1957).
The fundamental rights or interest interpretation of the due process clause is
discussed in: 2 L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 372-442 (1932); E. CORWIN, LIBER-
TY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 116-83 (1948); 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION
1119-58 (1953); H. WECHSLER, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL
RIGHTS (1970); Barnett, Vested Rights in the Common Law, 27 ORE. L. REV. 25 (1947);
Brockelbank, The Role of Due Process in American Constitutional Law, 39 CORNELL
L.Q. 561 (1954); Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928-29); Hyman & New house, Standards for Prefer-
red Freedoms, 60 NW. U.L. REV. 1 (1965); Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due
Process Adjudication-A Survey and a Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957); Warren,
The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926).
59. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Com-
ment, Validity of Sex Offenders Acts, 37 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1939); Comment, Sane
Laws for Sexual Psychopaths, 1 STAN. L. REV. 486 (1949). See generally Karst, supra
note 13; Kurland, supra note 13; Symposium, supra note 13.
As to which factor, fundamental interest or suspect classification, is more sig-
nificant, see Note, Serrano v. Priest. "Equal" Protection and Public School Finance, 8
CALIF. W.L. REV. 547, 561 (1972) ("The purpose of the equal protection clause should be
more to protect 'fundamental interests' than to ferret out and extinguish 'suspect
classifications.' ").
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grounds other than those related to legitimate governmental pur-
poses the presumption of constitutionality has been abandoned in
certain cases and the risk of non-persuasion shifted from those who
challenged the law to those who defended it.
This shift in burden of proof to the government, which in-
creases the probability the legislation will be struck down, is the
crucial difference between the compelling interest standard and the
rational basis standard. Together they constitute the two-tier ap-
proach.w0 The compelling interest standard has been restricted
primarily to cases involving voting rights,"1 school segregation," and
criminal defendants." The Court's reluctance to act as a super legis-
lature in selecting or identifying other interests to be characterized
as fundamental may be because the rights of accused criminals and
60. Significantly, one commentator has observed: "Since 1944 the Court has
not held any classification or action infringing an interest that triggers the strict
scrutiny test to be justified by a compelling state interest." Richards, Equal Oppor-
tunity and School Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudication,
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32 (1973). See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
61. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Lucas v. Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Kauper, Some Comments on the
Reapportionment Cases, 63 MICH. L. REV. 729 (1969); Lucas, Legislative Apportion-
ment and Representative Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L.
REV. 711 (1963); Macleod & Wilberding, State Voting Requirements and Civil Rights,
38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 93 (1969).
62. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Bikel, The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Black, The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421-30 (1960); Kelly, The Four-
teenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1049
(1956); Kohn, Social Psychological Data, Legislative Fact, and Constitutional Law, 29
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136 (1960); Roche, Plessy v. Ferguson: Requiescat in Pace? 103 U.
PA. L. REV. 44 (1954); Sanders, The School Segregation Cases, 7 VAND. L. REV. 985
(1954); Waite, Race Segregation in the Public Schools: Jim Crow at the Judgment
Seat, 38 MINN. L. REV. 612 (1954); Comment, Separate But Equal Doctrine and the
Segregation Cases, 19 ALB. L. REV. 233 (1955). See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954); Kills Crow v. United States, 451 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1971). See generally
Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 13
(1939); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937).
63. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 371 (1972); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Note,
Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fines and Costs: A New Look at the Law and the
Constitution, 22 VAND. L. REV. 611 (1969) (criminal fines); Comment, Fines, Imprison-
ment and the Poor: "Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days," 57 CALIF. L. REV. 778 (criminal
fines); Comment, Imprisonment for Debt and the Constitution, 1970 LAW & Soc. ORD.
659 (1971) (imprisonment for civil debt).
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voters, and the equal protection of law for all races are guaranteed
by specific constitutional provisions."
The Supreme Court in recent decisions has delimited the equal
protection clause and the court's role in judging legislative classifi-
cations by its treatment of interests which could have been labeled
fundamental and classifications that could have been characterized
as suspect. 5 In one case the Court held that the traditional test was
better than the compelling interest test because the former did not
allow federal courts to impose their views of what constituted wise
economic or social policy upon government.66 A second decision con-
sidered the possible racial implications of an article in the California
constitution which required community approval before initiating
low-rent housing projects. 7 The Court, satisfied the article did not
64. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Not long after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment the Court indicates
the amendment extended to considerations and situations outside those concerned with
race. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (rights of criminals and jury
composition); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (economic discrimina-
tion against certain businesses).
65. Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975); Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361
(1974; Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973);
James v. Valtierra 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
66. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also Note, Maryland's
Maximum Grant Regulation on AFDC Payments Does Not Violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause nor Is It Inconsistent with the Social Security Act, 35 ALB. L. REV. 416
(1971); Note, The Maximum Welfare Grant, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 271 (1970); Note, A Judicial
Cease Fire in the War on Poverty? 36 Mo. L. REV. 117 (1971); Note, Dandridge v.
Williams: Equal Protection and Welfare Law, 1 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 119
(1971); Comment, Legal Rights of AFDC Recipients After Rosado v. Wyman and Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 207 (1971); Comment, The Equal Protection
Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61
(1971).
For comments favorable to the position of welfare petitioners that discrimina-
tion against the poor creates a suspect classification, and the dissent of Justices Bren-
nan, Douglas, and Marshall in Dandridge, see R. O'NEIL, THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCE:
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WELFARE STATE (1970); Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial
Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1970); Graham, Civil
Liberties Problems in Welfare Administration, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 839 (1968); Reinstein,
The Welfare Cases: Fundamental Rights, the Poor and the Burden of Proof in Con-
stitutional Litigation, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1970).
On the effect of Dandridge in foreclosing recognition of education as a funda-
-mental interest, see Comment, Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws,
and the Supreme Court, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1324 (1972).
67. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See, e.g., Lefcoe, The Public Hous-
ing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1384 (1971);
Note, Mandatory Referendum Approval of Low-Rent Housing Projects, 46 TUL. L.
REV. 806 (1972); Note, James v. Valtierra. Housing Discrimination by Referendum? 39
Gammon: Equal Protection of the Laws and San Antonio Independent School D
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977
456 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11
classify on the basis of race, declared the article was not unconstitu-
tional just because it kept persons from obtaining public housing.
The Court refused to consider whether the article classified citizens
by wealth. 8 In Boddie v. Connecticut,"9 the Court could have de-
clared it was a denial of equal protection to bar indigents from
divorce proceedings because they were unable to pay court costs. In-
stead the Court held the petitioners did have a right to proceed
without payment of fees. But because the Court rested its decision
on due process not equal protection Boddie could be interpreted as a
philosophical stand-off. If it was an expansion of due process then it
was also a limitation of equal protection." The holding of Boddie was
subsequently restricted in 1973, when the Supreme Court held there
U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1971); Note, Mandatory Referendum and Approval for Low-Rent
Housing Projects: A Denial of Equal Protection? 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 790 (1971); Note,
Public Housing for Low Income Families-Mandatory Referendum Requirement, 1972
Wis. L. REV. 268. Comment, Mandatory Referendum on Low-Income Housing, 13 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 603 (1972); Comment, The Poor, Equal Protection, and Public
Housing: James v. Valtierra- Where to from Here?, 20 KAN. L. REV. 253 (1972). See
also Comment, Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and the
Supreme Court, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1324 (1972) (Valtierra suggests wealth is not a
suspect classification.).
68. 402 U.S. at 140-42.
69. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). For comments on Boddie, see Note, Prepayment of
Filing Fees as a Condition Precedent to the Grant of a Discharge in Bankruptcy of an
Indigent Petitioner Denies Equal Protection, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 781 (1972); Note, Bod-
die v. Connecticut: Free Access to Civil Courts for Indigents, 76 DICK. L. REV. 749
(1972); Note, Access to Courts-Indigents Seeking Divorce Decree, 10 DuQ. L. REV.
123 (1971); Note, A State's Denial to Indigents of Access to Its Courts in a Divorce
Proceeding Due to Financial Barriers Is a Violation of Due Process, 20 KAN. L. REV.
554 (1972); Note, State's Refusal To Permit Indigents To Institute Divorce Actions
Without Prepayment of Court Fees and Service Costs Is a Denial of Due Process, 47
NOTRE DAME LAW. 366 (1972); Note, Boddie v. Connecticut and the Constitutional
Rights of Indigents, 46 TUL. L. REV. 799 (1972); Note, Indigent Access to Civil Courts:
The Tiger Is at the Gates, 26 VAND. L. REV. 25 (1973); Comment, Boddie v. Connec-
ticut: Wither the Indigent Civil Litigant?, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 427 (1973).
70. The holding of Boddie was subsequently restricted in 1973, when the
Supreme Court held there was neither a statutory right under the Bankruptcy Act
and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), nor a constitutional right within the meaning of due process
and equal protection to proceed in bankruptcy without payment of fees. United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). See McGuire, The Indigent Debtor's Dred Scott 47 Am.
BANKR. L.J. 157 (1973); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Forward& Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973); Com-
ment, The Right of Access to Civil Courts by Indigents: A Prognosis, 24 AM. U.L.
REV. 129 (1974); Comment, United States v. Kras: Justice as a Price, 40 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 147 (1973); Comment, Access to Courts in Civil Cases: An Extension of Boddie
Refused, 3 CAP. U.L. REV. 115 (1974); Comment, The Heirs of Boddie: Court Access for
Indigent Litigants: Searching for the Remains of Boddie After a Kras-Landing, 48 IND.
L.J. 452 (1973); Comment, Conditioning Indigent's Discharge in Bankruptcy Upon Pay-
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was neither a statutory right under the Bankruptcy Act and 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a), nor a constitutional right within the meaning of due
process and equal protection to proceed in bankruptcy without pay-
ment of fees. In a fifth case, in which an indigent criminal was
denied a second appeal because the court would not appoint an at-
torney, wealth discrimination was not viewed as creating a suspect
classification; the Court held that the fourteenth amendment does
not require the state to equalize economic conditions."
Claims to objectivism and consistency fail when these decisions
are contrasted with earlier opinions of the Court. Comparing the
Court's treatment of the equal protection issues in the preceding
five cases with earlier cases in which the compelling interests were
used indicates the selection of a standard of review was determined
by the Court's characterization of the classification and the interest
that was affected. For example, a right to divorce or abort a fetus
would not universally be accepted as more basic than the right to
housing or an education, nor can either the former or latter be said
to be expressly provided for in the Constitution. To those who
would defend the Court's recent equal protection analysis as an
honest effort to deal with the dilemmas of constitutional adjudica-
tion by seeking a contemporary compromise based on inferences
from the text of the Constitution, it could be replied that superficial-
ly the recent analysis can be better explained with less sophistication
as manipulation of a test or tool to effect a retrenchment from the
egalitarian meanderings of the Warren Court.
EDUCATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST AND WEALTH
AS A SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION
The Court in Rodriguez, even using the contemporary com-
ment of Filing Fees Held Constitutional, 25 MERCER L. REV. 343 (1974); Comment, The
Indigent and Access to the Civil Courts, 52 N.C. L. REV. 172 (1973); Comment, Con-
stitutional Law-Right to Bankruptcy-Equal Protection-Due Process, 19 N.Y.L.F.
894 (1974); Comment, Bankruptcy and the Poor, the Constitutionality of Filing Fees,
1973 UTAH L. REV. 302 (1973); Note, Constitutional Law: Supreme Court Denies In-
digents Access to the Courts, 8 VAL. U.L. REV. 455 (1974). See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding the Iowa divorce residency requirement and refusing any ex-
tension of Boddie); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, petition for rehearing denied, 411
U.S. 922 (1973).
On the probability that Boddie would be limited and restricted, as it subse-
quently was in Kras and Ortwein, see Note, Indigent's Access to Civil Court, 4 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 267, 294 (1972). Contra, e.g., LaFrance, Constitutional Law
Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DUKE L.J. 487, 537; Comment,
Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and Advertising, 8 HARV.
C.R.-C. L. REV. 77, 98 (1973). See also Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 1013-16.
71. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
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promise approach of inferring the importance of education from the
text of the Constitution under a "nexus" theory (declaring education
is so closely related to certain expressed constitutional rights and
liberties such as the right to vote that it too is fundamental), could
have as easily justified strict scrutiny of the Texas public school
finance law as to rationalize use of the less demanding rational basis
standard. Precedents existed on both sides; holding either that
education was a fundamental interest or that it was not a funda-
mental interest could have been supported by selecting the proper
precedents. This shows the weakness of the current equal protection
approach which requires a fundamental right of petitioner, a suspect
classification effectively inhibiting exercise of that right, and the
lack of a compelling governmental policy, but which allows no grada-
tions or balancing of the first and second elements.
Identifying or declaring a right or interest to be fundamental
which is not explicitly so enumerated in the Constitution is difficult
because such a declaration can hardly be limited to the case before
the Court. No single criterion for identifying fundamental interests
could guarantee either fairness in every case or that additional
rights would not meet that criterion in the future. Identification of
fundamental rights often depends on the beliefs of the individual or
court that decides the case. Any such declaration has ramifications
for other interests that can be compared to the interest judged to
be fundamental. For example, should the right to procreate be judged
fundamental and a state is barred from sterilizing citizens, can that
not be used to argue that neither should the state prevent sexual ac-
tivity or the use of birth control devices under a right to engage in
sex apart from procreation?"2 A better approach would be to ask
which interests should be given judicial protection and to what
degree these interests should be protected." Using this analysis,
recognition of education as a fundamental interest would be based
on sound judicial precedent and logic.7'
72. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
73. Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards,
and the Indigent's Right of Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. REV. 223 (1970); Note,
Discrimination Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. REV.
435, 437-39 (1967).
74. The Court has often acknowledged both the importance of education and
the public support of education. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Americans regard the public schools as
a most vital civil institution for the preservation of a democratic system of govern-
ment."); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 438, 493 (1954) ("It is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
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Determining whether a particular classification created by
statute is suspect can be as difficult as identifying fundamental in-
terests. Instead of declaring particular classifications or groupings
such as those based on wealth, as always suspect, identifying
elements of invidious classification would be more useful."5 The
elements of invidious classification have been delineated by several
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ("The American people have always regarded education and ac-
quisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently
promoted."); International Consolidated Street Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87
(1907) ("Education is one of the first objects of public care."); Hosier v. Evans, 314 F.
Supp. 316 (D. V.I. 1970) ("Education is a basic personal right."). See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 237-39 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967) (The classroom is the market place of ideas.); Illinois ex rel McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Education is
the most powerful agency for poromoting cohesion among a heterogenous people and
the symbol of our common destiny.); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
(1938); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Many legal scholars have argued education should be recognized as a funda-
mental interest. Richards proclaimed:
In terms of the fundamental quality of the interest, the opportunity in-
volved in Rodriguez is even more fundamental than the liberties that
those early cases justly called inestimable.
Richards, supra note 60, at 52. Wilkinson explained the function of education:
A judicial role should exist in behalf of equality of opportunity .... The
rights that lie closest to our opportunity to take best advantage of our
personal potential are education, whose function it is to develop our
natural gifts and interests, and the right to seek a career comensurate
with our abilities and desires.
Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 976, 986. A third writer defended education as a funda-
mental theory under a nexus theory:
The "nexus theory" [that education is fundamental because it is so closely
related to first amendment rights] is logical, workable, and desirable but
the majority opinion in the instant case [Rodriguez] shows the Court's
undeniable dedication to the incumbent two-tiered equal protection test
for fundamental rights.
Note, Equal Protection of the Laws: Education Is Not a Fundamental Right 23 U.
FLA. L. REV. 155, 159 (1973). See also Note, Validity of Texas Public School Financing
System, 12 DuQ. L. REv. 348, 364 (1973); Comment, Serrano v. Priest and the Financ-
ing of Public Education in Kansas: Beyond the Rhetoric, 20 KAN. L. REV. 433 (1972)
(classification affecting education should be subject to strict scrutiny). But see Roos,
The Potential Impact of Rodriguez on Other School Reform Legislation, 38 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 566, 577 (1974) (The hopes that the Court would hold education was a
fundamental interest in Rodriguez were only inchoate because the judgments in
previous cases were made without the Court first finding education to be a funda-
mental interest.).
75. Noting the lack of a common denominator in those circumstances where
the Supreme Court has found a suspect classification and the inconsistency of analysis
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writers including Professor Michelman of Harvard who formulated
the following succinct definition:
An "invidious" classification or trait is one which com-
bines, in greater or lesser degree and in various propor-
tions, three qualities: (1) a general ill-suitedness to the
achievement of any proper governmental objective; (2) a
high degree of adaption to uses which are oppressive in
the sense of systematic and unfair devaluation, through
majority rule, of the claims of certain persons to nondis-
criminatory sharing in the benefits and burdens of social
existence; and (3) a potency to injure through an effect of
stigmatizing certain persons by implying popular or of-
ficial belief in their inherent inferiority or undeserving-
ness.76
The first element is the least valuable, for it only begs the
question of what is the relationship between the classification and
the governmental purpose. Some wealth classifications, for example
the income tax laws, are not generally ill-suited to a proper govern-
mental objective. Yet it can be argued this first element of Pro-
fessor Michelman's trinal definition is present in cases like Rod-
riguez because the present public school finance structures are
singularly ill-suited to achieving the avowed state purpose. States
have identified the compelling governmental interest under existing
school finance systems to be protection of local control. Few would
deny that preserving local autonomy over education policy and spend-
by the Court, one writer suggested the special need to protect discrete and insular
minorities was an appropriate reason for arguing that the existence of suspect traits
ought to be present before invoking the "heightened judicial solicitude" of the strict
scrutiny doctrine. Additionally, he contended the strict scrutiny doctrine should be
used whenever the classification "discriminates against an individual on the basis of
factors over which he has no control." Comment, supra note 53, at 720. See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (identifying alienage as a suspect classification); Labine
v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 551 n.19 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the
significance of situations where an individual has no control): United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
76. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Forward. On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 20 (1969).
Professor Michelman's first element is merely the converse of the equal protec-
tion requirement that under the first tier standard there be a rational relationship be-
tween the act and some governmental objective or that under the second tier standard
of review there be a compelling governmental objective. See Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Developments, supra note 13, at 1124-27, 1173-76; Note,
Discrimination Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. REV.
435 (1967).
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ing, local experimentation and innovation, or community involve-
ment and commitment to education are worthwhile goals. Yet critics
of the present financing programs correctly point out that because
of fiscal restraints poor districts have virtually no choice and little
control over education since all their funds must go for state
prescribed requisites. Requiring equal educational opportunity,
measured by equal dollar inputs, would actually increase local con-
trol throughout the state."
The second element is present in classifications based on
wealth, since the end results of virtually all discrimination are
poverty and oppression. The Supreme Court has long considered
classifications directed against members of a disadvantaged minori-
ty "suspect.""8 And the Court has implied that wealth discrimination
would afford an independent basis for strict judicial scrutiny, which
suggests the poor might be a disadvantaged minority: "A careful ex-
amination on our part is especially warranted where the lines are
drawn on the basis of wealth or race . . . two factors which would
independently render a classification highly suspect and thereby de-
mand a more exacting judicial scrutiny." '79 While Professor Michel-
77. See note 50 supra. See also Note, Equal Protection of the Laws: Educa-
tion Is Not a Fundamental Right 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 155, 160 (1973) (local control not a
sufficient state interest even under the rational-basis test); Comment, The Aftermath
of Serrano: The Strict Scrutiny Approach and the Viability of Property Tax Financing
for Public Educational Systems, 17 VILL. L. REV. 928 (1972).
78. McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
192 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
79. McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). Contra, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974);
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, petition for rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 922 (1973); United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Michelman, supra note 76, at 21 (wealth not yet a suspect
classification); Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV.
85 (1975) (Bullock v. Carter 405 U.S. 134 (1972) still valid but Rodriguez shows it will
not be expanded).
The Supreme Court initially has required only that a state show a compelling
governmental interest and the necessity of a wealth classification when the Court finds
the statutory classification affected a fundamental interest of those classified. Some
writers have cautioned against concluding wealth classifications as suspect:
While some broad language has been employed by the Supreme Court to
the effect that classifications based on wealth are not favored, "wealth
has not incurred the same degree of infamy as an inherently suspect basis
of classification as has race."
Fessler & Forrester, The Case for the Immediate Environment, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 1, 9-10 (1970); Schwartz, Municipal Services Litigation After Rodriguez, 40
BROOKLYN L. REV. 93 (1973).
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man questioned whether strict scrutiny would be invoked based on-
ly upon a wealth classification, he argued classifications based on
wealth should be regarded as suspect." Participation in removing
invidious classifications should not be restricted to the class or
minority who are the object of the discrimination, for it is in the
best interest of all members of a democratic republic to extend
equal protection of law and due process of law to every individual
within the society.
The stigmatizing effect of invidious classifications-Professor
Michelman's third element-is also an invariable result of wealth
classifications. In our society nothing is more stigmatizing than
poverty. The advantages of going to good public schools, usually
classified as good because they are in richer areas that have the
financial ability to support education, begin with application to col-
leges which favor graduates of these schools and continue through-
out life.
In summary, evaluation of public school financing systems,
even under the two-tier approach, could have resulted in those
systems being held unconstitutional. The majority in Rodriguez
could have concluded that a fundamental interest did exist, either
education or equal educational opportunity, and that the inter-
district wealth discrepancies or per pupil spending discrepancies did
80. Professor Michelman has explained:
The convincing reasons which can be offered for extremely skeptical
judicial inspection of official acts which explicitly classify by race seem ap-
plicable to statutes which explicitly or designedly classify by wealth or in-
come, in the sense of deliberately subdividing the population according to
wealth or income criterion for the purpose of extending different treat-
ment to the groups so distinguished.
Michelman, supra note 34, at 20-21. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 13, at 179.
But Justice Stewart for the majority in Dandridge expressed a contrary view:
The administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast [with
business regulation cases], involves the most basic economic needs of im-
poverished human beings. We recognize the dramatically real factual dif-
ference . . . but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional
standard. ...
[Tlhe Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to
impose upon the states their views of what constitutes wise economic or
social policy. ...
' * * [T]he intractable economic, social and even philosophical prob-
lems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the
business of this Court.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970); Comment, Educational Financing,
Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Cour4 70 MICH. L. REV. 1324, 1335
(1972).
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involve a suspect classification. This conclusion would have man-
dated a more strict judicial review of the Texas school finance laws,
which would have probably resulted in the finance system being in-
validated because of its disparities in taxable wealth and resource
expenditures.
CRITICISMS OF AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE
Two-TIER APPROACH
The two-tier approach to equal protection has been assailed by
both jurists and scholars primarily for its rigidity and the unfairness
of the all or nothing categorizations that determine the outcome.
Several writers have proposed as an alternative other approaches
which weigh and balance the various factors rather than polarizing
the results of only two factors as is done under the two-tier ap-
proach.
The dissent of Justice Marshall in Rodriguez is representative
of the judicial sentiment on the Court that disfavors using the two-
tier approach to equal protection problems.81 Justice Marshall earlier
stated:
In my view, equal protection analysis of this case is not
appreciably advanced by the a priori definition of a
"right," fundamental or otherwise. Rather, concentration
must be placed upon the character of the classification in
question, the relative importance to individuals in the
class discriminated against of the governmental benefits
that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests
in support of the classification. 2
For Justice Marshall the character or nature of the classification
and interest of those challenging the statute is most important. The
judicial tags of fundamental or constitutionally inferable are not con-
trolling in themselves, but under the two-tier approach the label is
all important. Justice Powell shied away from the two-tier approach
in two 1974 cases and used a test which balanced individual rights
and governmental interests, thereby approximating a due process
approach which is less restricted in both the identification and pro-
81. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting.) See notes 89-90 infra.
82. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissen-
ting).
1977]
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tection of fundamental rights. 3 Even Chief Justice Burger has
acknowledged that the two-tier approach does not really help to
decide anything, at least regarding delineation of suspect classifica-
tions, thus indicating the value of the approach is to explain a deci-
sion rather than to help in deciding a case even though the latter
was its intended purpose. 4
One writer prophetically predicted the Court's use of the two-
tier approach in Rodriguez, and simultaneously identified how it
might be misused to justify a decision rather than used to reach a
decision on the merits. 5 A second criticism of the limitation of equal
protection in Rodrigvez was that although the current concern of
the equal protection has been racial discrimination, the purposes of
the fourteenth amendment have been historically characterized
more abstractly and the equal protection clause has been understood
to embody broader principles of fair treatment in economic and
business regulations and other areas." The Court's use of the two-
83. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 623 (1974) (Powell, J., con-
curring); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
See Yackle, supra note 13, at 205-06.
84. Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 983 n.195 (The "code phrase" of "suspect
classification," Chief Justice Burger has complained, tends "to stop analysis while ap-
pearing to suggest an analytical process."). See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 730 (1973)
(Burger, C.J. dissenting).
According to Professor Wilkinson, Justice Rehnquist might not abandon the
two-tier approach but he would at least confine equal protection strict scrutiny to mat-
ters of race. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissen-
ting); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 949.
The problem which the Court has had with the two-tier approach is failing to
recognize that what was supposed to be a test or tool for evaluating challenged
statutes has become a constitutional doctrine, and the difference between a test which
should be fair and neutral and a doctrine which can be defended and used to support a
position has been blurred.
85. Professors Clune, Coons, and Sugarman warned:
If the Court is intimidated by the high stakes involved [in the suits
challenging the state school finance laws] it may wash its hands in the
warm waters of the rationality test.
Clune, Coons, & Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 2 YALE L. Soc. ACTION 111,
114 (1971); Note, Public Education Financed Partially Through Local Property Taxes
Is Not Proper Subject for Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 18 How. L.J. 435, 444 (1974). See
also Comment, supra note 80, at 1359 ("If the Court anticipated outright resistance to
its decrees, it might prefer to avoid involvement in educational financing litigation
altogether.").
Other writers have advocated all equal protection cases be given full treatment
on the merits. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 13; Yackle, supra note 13, at 192.
86. Brest, supra note 13, at 598. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). Con-
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tier approach was also criticized in less specific terms." Justice
Holmes, for example, recognized the complexity of judicial analysis
and the futility of trying to develop simple, unchangable but univer-
sally applicable formulas for resolving difficult issues. He explained
the personal prejudices of the Court would have as much influence
on the decision as these formulas, which might conceal the true ratio
decide ndi. 88
tra, Cox, Forward. Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966) ("Once loosed, the idea of equality is not easily cabined.").
87. See, e.g., Note, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: A
Retreat from Equal Protection, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 585, 600 (1973) (The Rodriguez ap-
proach to equal protection was wrong and the decision could be used to effectively
eliminate the equal protection clause as an effective constitutional means of protecting
vital individual interests from arbitrary state discrimination.); Tribe, The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 105 114 (1973) (The Court's use of the two-tier
equal protection analysis in Rodriguez was unfortunate.); Note, supra note 77, at 159.
See also Millikin v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 760 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (It is still
clear that the poor must pay their own way.); Tushnet, supra note 13, at 179 (The pre-
sent principle of the Supreme Court appears to be "equal protection for the rich, social
experimentation for the poor.").
88. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The felt necessities of the time,
the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed or un-
conscious, have had a good deal more to do that the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed."); Harrison, What Now After San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez? Electorial Inequality and the Public School
Finance Systems in California and Texas, 5 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 191, 213 (1974).
Perhaps the most telling criticism was the analogy drawn by Professor Paul
Freund, "The world does not move on a 'binary' principle." Wilkinson, supra note 13,
at 948 n.15 (1975).
The paradox of the two-tier approach and the inherent weakness of any binary
system were identified in the article by Professor Wilkinson. Selection of either the ra-
tional basis standard or the compelling interest test will normally determine how the
decision will go since the consequences flowing from selecting one of the standards are
polar extremes. Yet choosing a standard is based on whether a particular classification
is deemed suspect or a specific interest is recognized to be fundamental, and unfor-
tunately, there has been no consistent discernable pattern from which it could be con-
cluded or predicted with certainty how the particular interest and classification in any
given case would be characterized. The result is that very similar cases, either from
the standpoint of the interests or the classifications involved, may be decided different-
ly because the nebulous and changing requirements for strict scrutiny are said to be
barely satisfied in one case but not quite satisfied in another. Professor Wilkinson ex-
plained the deficiency of the two-tier approach:
This analysis is deferential because the lenient "rational basis" scrutiny
applied to most statutes almost never results in voidance of the legisla-
tion, though the heightened "compelling state interest" scrutiny almost in-
variably will. It is rigid because in theory it permits only two widely
variant levels of scrutiny with no gradation for rights of intermediate im-
portance. It is deficient. . ..
Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 948.
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Fortunately, recent criticism of the majority's two-tier ap-
proach has frequently been accompanied with suggested alternatives
for evaluati-ig claimed denials of equal protection. The best known
alternative is the sliding scale or spectrum approach endorsed by
Justice Marshall, who argued in his dissenting opinion in Rodriguez
that the Court has already used a sliding scale approach though ad-
mittedly without verbally sanctioning or even expressly recognizing
it." This spectrum or sliding scale analysis involv, measuring and
contrasting the character of the classification in question, the
relative importance to the individuals in the class discriminated
against, the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification."
The advantage of Justice Marshall's approach is that it acknow-
ledges the complexity of equal protection analysis and requires the
petitioner's classification and interest be measured against the
governmental interest in each case. Because it is more flexible it can
be employed with greater fairness to individual litigants; their
claims will not be foreclosed by a predetermination that their in-
terests are important but not expressly covered by the Constitution.
Justice Marshall's approach lacks the consistency of the two-tier ap-
proach because it does not automatically disregard all interests not
enumerated in the Constitution, but such consistency is unworthy of
perpetuation. Related benefits from Justice Marshall's approach are,
first, that every case has to be treated on its merits, and second, the
importance of categorization and phraseology is decreased so the
case does not turn, as it does under the two-tier approach, on the
language used to describe the circumstances. The spectrum ap-
proach is superior tu the two-tier approach because all facts are
weighed and balanced, not just the two polar characterizations of
fundamental or non-fundamental interests and suspect or non-
suspect classifications. Additionally, one writer has suggested the
considerations called for in spectrum analysis provide a model that
89. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99,
109-10 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see notes 43, 45, 49 (supra).
Justice Marshall identified no less than six instances where he claimed the
Court had already used the more flexible spectrum approach. See Kramer v. Union
Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); Comment, Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative to Strict
Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to Lafleur, 62 GEO. L.J. 1173, 1200 (1974).
90. See notes 43, 45, 49 supra.
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would be of even greater benefit to legislatures than it would be to
courts."'
One intermediate spectrum approach can be precisely identi-
fied. The Supreme Court has said a statute is invalid if it rests on
an "irrebuttable presumption" that is contrary to law and fact.92 In
cases in which such language has replaced the two-tier approach
rhetoric of rational basis and compelling state interest it seems to
have been an attempt to avoid the undesirable results of upholding
a constitutionally suspect statute by restructuring the analysis or
adjudication from equal protection to due process. This new stand-
ard, which is more stringent than a minimum rational relationship
test but less fatal to those challenging the constitutionality of state
laws than strict scrutiny, is triggered by a finding of an irrebuttable
statutory presumption.93 The advantage of this standard is that it
"allows the legislature freedom to experiment with various answers
to difficult social welfare problems without fear that statutes will be
overturned on sweeping equal protection grounds," since the
legislature does not automatically risk having its statutes subjected
to the compelling interest standard because an interest that could
91. Professor Brest of California explained that Marshall's approach would
benefit legislatures:
(If Marshall's criterion seems] too amorphous to guide decision making by
a nonrepresentative judiciary, it nonetheless speaks to a legislator....
As the interest affected by legislation becomes more important
and the classifications more invidious, the parochialism, self-interest,
logrolling, and the like, that pervade the political process must yield to
generally shared principles of fair treatment.
Brest, supra note 13, at 599.
It is hard to disagree with what appears to be Professor Brest's two-fold
premise. First, he implies that categorizing interests as fundamental and classifications
as suspect or non-suspect are judicial-type, all or nothing, win or lose judgments that a
legislator can easily dismiss as close questions that could legitimately go either way.
Second, he suggests that a balancing test would require weighing the individual's in-
terests and the classification together in each instance so the legislator would have to
do more than flip a coin to make a decision. The legislator would have to actually think
about the legislation's impact on the individual and whether there are less objec-
tionable means of attaining the governmental goal, rather than dismissing the in-
dividual's claim out-of-hand just because the legislation is not totally unrelated to any
governmental objective.
92. Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975), rev'g
531 P.2d 870 (Utah 1975); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S.
508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE, & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
OTHER PROBLEMS 138-41 (Supp. 1975); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, The Conclusive Presumption
Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974).
93. 423 U.S. 44.
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be labeled fundamental is affected. It thus strikes an appropriate
balance between judicial deference to the legislature and judicial in-
tervention of behalf of the individual."
A second proposal, similar to the spectrum approach of Justice
Marshall, was presented by Professor Gunther of Stanford, who sug-
gested a model of "means" scrutiny by which the Court would re-
quire that the means chosen by the legislature substantially advance
a particular articulated governmental purpose rather than any con-
ceivable governmental objective which the reviewing court, with the
benefit of hindsight, could dream up when it considers the case.95
The problem with Professor Gunther's approach would be identify-
ing the circumstances when legislative intent would be implied and
the limits of such implications.
A third alternative to the two-tier approach and its concomi-
tant identification of fundamental interests either limited to those
explicitly enumerated in the Constitution or those inferable because
of their importance. merits discussion. But because of its complexity
only those aspects applicable to the claims of petitioners in the
school financing cases are discussed here. Professor Wilkinson of
Virginia acknowledged varying gradations of classifications and in-
terests but he first identified the three visages of constitutional
equality: political equality, equality of opportunity, and economic
equality." Suits challenging school finance systems, by his defini-
tions, would fall into the second category, equality of opportunity.
Wilkinson suggests equality of opportunity simply indicates there is
a governmental background that favors none but instead allows all
an equal chance to survive, pursue, and succeed.97 His proposed stand-
94. Comment, supra note 89, at 1200-01; see also Yackle, supra note 13, at
205-06.
95. Gunther, supra note 13, at 20-48.
96. Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 970-1016.
Political equality is protected by the specific constitutional guarantees of the
right of assembly and to vote. Equality of opportunity means the government does not
have to provide everyone with success or income, but it does have an obligation to see
that the opportunities to succeed are equal. Economic quality, however, would provide
the same economic benefits for all regardless of who needed or deserved them.
Economic equality should not be guaranteed. The willingness of the judiciary to in-
tervene should vary, according to Professor Wilkinson, along the lines of this tertiary
division. Id. at 976 ("A judicial role should exist in behalf of equality of opportunity,
stronger than that for economic equality but not so affirmative as in the area of
political equality.").
97. One writer defined equal opportunity:
[W]e might say that those with similar abilities and skills should have
similar life chances .... In all sectors of society there should be roughly
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ard for evaluating alleged equal protection denials of equal oppor-
tunity involve balancing the opportunity being denied with the state
interest served in denying it, in light of the particular group af-
fected ."
Several writers have analyzed the proposed alternaives to the
two-tier approach9 Comparing the alternatives with the two-tier ap-
equal prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly
motivated and endowed.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73 (1971); Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 987. See also E.
VAN DEN HAAG, EDUCATION AS AN INDUSTRY 39 (1956).
Admitting this places a premium on ability since differences in talent and in-
dustry will result in disparity of achievement and equality of opportunity favors those
with natural ability, Professor Wilkinson defended this system as being most consis-
tent with the history, Constitution, and values of America. Wilkinson, supra note 13.
Because the key is equal opportunity, which in education means equal dollar ex-
penditures per pupil, rather than economic equality or guaranteed achievement, Pro-
fessor Wilkinson's concept of equality is consistent with the social imperative of pro-
viding equal educational opportunity. Id. at 987.
98. Explaining how denials of opportunity should be evaluated Wilkinson said:
The Constitutional inquiry to test governmental denials of equal oppor-
tunity ought to weigh and to balance carefully the following elements: 1)
the importance of the opportunity being unequally burdened or denied; 2)
the strength of the state interest served in denying it; and 3) the
character of the groups whose opportunities are denied.
Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 991.
This standard is a considerable improvement over the two-tier approach. First,
it does not force all or nothing characterizations of interests and classifications but
rather it allows a balancing of the elements involved. Second, it is more flexible and
could be applied to achieve more consistently fair judgments. Finally, by considering
the character of the group granted or denied a particular opportunity, it would permit
legislation to stand which under the two-tier approach would probably be struck down
as involving a "suspect classification," such as legislation favoring racial minorities or
disadvantaged individuals. Affirmative action legislation favoring minorities historical-
ly discriminated against would usually be upheld under this test.
99. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 13, at 598 (Justice Marshall's proposal neither
compelled nor foreclosed by the equal protection clause); Carrington, Financing the
American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1229, 1259
(1973); Dorsen, Equal Protection of the Laws, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 357 (1974); Good-
paster, supra note 13, at 503 (suggesting an intermediate standard between the pre-
sent extremes of the two-tier approach); Nowak, supra note 13 (comparing various
standards and advocating the use of an intermediate standard); Richards, supra note
60, at 34-35; Taylor, Avoiding the "Thicket," 2 J.L. & EDUC. 482-83 (1973) (Court's test
for assessing interest in Rodriguez "hardly more serviceable or less arbitrary than the
test it rejected"); Yackle, supra note 13, at 190-93; Note, supra note 77, at 159; Note,
San Antonio Independent School district v. Rodriguez: A Study of Alternatives Open
to State Courts, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 90, 112 (1973); Comment, supra note 56, at 112-13;
Comment, supra note 77, at 948.
Professor Kurland identified another consideration, the problem of legislatures
and courts being able to predict the acceptance and consequences of egalitarian rul-
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proach should have led them to the conviction that a single formula
or test, such as the two-tier approach, whether it involves two or
three elements may not be a sufficiently sophisticated basis for
resolving complex equal protection problems when those elements
are all or nothing characterizations determined by questions that
have to be answered either yes or no. Labeling interests as funda-
mental or classifications as suspect should be less important than
balancing the particular interest and nature of the classification
against the state's interest. The state's purpose, alternatives for
achieving that purpf)se, the incidental effects of the legislation, and
even the potential ramifications of judicial invalidation could be
balanced in decidin., whether to uphold the legislation, rather than
automatically thr-usting a practically insurmountable burden upon
the state of show':ig a compelling state interest simply because an
interest is labeled fundamental or a classification is labeled suspect.
CONCLUSION
Careful examination of Rodriguez and other wealth discrimina-
tion cases reveals an inconsistency of analysis by the Supreme
Court.1® It shows that recent equal protection analysis has been
deceptive and a tool the Court has used to justify its decisions. The
Court's inconsistent if not catalectic reasoning is demonstrated by
reviewing circumstances evaluated by the Court in other decisions
in which application of those concepts or principles expressed in
Rodriguez would have resulted in a contrary verdict. Decisions
upholding election filing fees and poll taxes, while simply requiring
that such expenses be waived for those few individuals who could
prove absolute indigency, would have been consistent with the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Rodriguez. In reapportionment,
criminal appeal, or court access cases the Court could have required,
in harmony with Rodriguez, proof of actual injury so that the peti-
tioner or appellant would have to prove his lost political influence
ings. He stated that to be effective broad social policy decisions must first involve a
simple constitutional standard that is easily understood. Second, he explained these
decisions had to present a rule and remedy that courts are capable of enforcing. Third,
he observed these decisions must formulate a rule which the public will generally ac-
quiesce in as it is announced and applied. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity:
The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 583, 596-99
(1968).
100. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977);
Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dan-
dridge v. Williams,.397 U.S. 471 (1970). Contra, e.g., Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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would make a difference in a specific election, his criminal appeal
would be successful, or the judicial proceeding would culminate in a
meaningful judgment for the petitioner.1"' Contrastingly, the logic of
those cases which held that an indigent could proceed in court and
obtain a divorce even if she lacked court fees, that poll taxes were
unconstitutional, and that an indigent criminal could not be denied
counsel or his right to appeal would have supported the conclusion
in Rodriguez that the correlation between wealth and spending per
child was significant and that children in poorer districts did repre-
sent an identifiable class which was discriminated against because
they were deprived of equal educational opportunities.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to recognize the
legitimate claims of petitioners to a more equitable apportionment of
educational opportunity. It is in cases like Rodriguez where discrimi-
nation is against those lacking the political or economic power
necessary to obtain satisfactory redress of their grievances from the
other two branches of government that judicial intervention is war-
ranted, if not requisite, if the constitutional promises of justice, due
process, and equal protection of the laws are to be provided and
preserved for all Americans. 2 But the quarrel with the Supreme
Court majority's perception of judicial responsibility can be at-
101. Goldtein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical
Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504 (1972); Note,
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: Inequitable but Not Unequal
Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 SW. L.J. 712, 719 (1973). See also
Yudof, The Politics of Futility, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 468 (1973) (Past decisions did not
stand on proof of injury and criminals did not have to show provision of a transcript
would result in acquittal.); Note, Validity of Texas Public School Financing System, 12
DuQ. L. REV. 348, 364 (1973) (Access to equal representation and not access to the
ballot box itself is the interest upheld in Reynolds.).
Decisions that might have been different if the reasoning in Rodriguez had
predominated in the consideration of those cases include the following. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
102. Promoting the role of the courts in protecting civil liberties Richards
noted:
Assuming the existence of a trained judiciary independent of the other
branches and possessing a special technique by which to interpret and en-
force the fundamental civil rights, a certain amount of judicial supremacy
in interpreting and enforcing the fundamental civil rights is also
justifiable.
Richards, supra note 60, at 49. See Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the
Courts, 51 TEx. L. REV. 411, 419 (1972) ("Courts are appropriate forums for redressing
inequality in access to resources and racial discrimination grievances."). See also Note,
supra note 77, at 159-60; Comment, supra note 80, at 1359.
19771
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tributed to a difference of political persuasion-a philosophical
divarication. The majority's presentation of the decision as the only
possible verdict and logical consequence of a consciously developed,
internally consistent, historically accurate, and objective analysis
based on long standing constitutional doctrines was as lamentable as
the actual holding. Rather than admit the novelty of the claims and
issues and the political philosophies influencing its decision, the
Court tried to insulate itself from criticism by rationalizing why the
circumstances mandated the Court come down on one side instead of
the other. This manipulation of the equal protection analysis
amounted to a shell game, which obtenebrated and enshrouded the
issues and ratio decidendi
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1977], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss3/5
Gammon: Equal Protection of the Laws and San Antonio Independent School D
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977
Vo lparaisoumniuSri 1977 Num
Volume 11 Spring 1977 Number3
EXECUTIVE BOARD
GEORGE W. CARBERRY
Editor-in-Chief
DAVID A. FOELBER
Articles Editor
JOHN W. LOHRMANN
Note Editor
MARCIA L. GIENAPP
Executive Editor
RUTH M. HENNAGE
MICHAEL R. MOROW
GREGORY W. SCHROEDER
STEPHEN MAASSEN
Business Manager
WILLIAM J. BOKLUND
CAROL ANN BOWMAN
WARREN P. SIMONSEN
ROBERT TRAVERS
MICHAEL C. WEISS
Associate Editors
RONALD P. GEIERSBACH
Associate Business Manager
STAFF
MICHAEL HAUGHEE
ALWIN M. TAMOSIUS
FACULTY ADVISOR
BRUCE G. BERNER
CANDIDATES
RICHARD A. BROWNE
ROBERT J. EHRENBERG
STEPHEN F. FISCHER
EDWARD A. GRAFTON
RALPH R. HUFF
GREGORY A. KAHRE
STEVEN E. KING
PAMELA P. KOSENKA
RHONDA P. LEVIN
MARK J. MAHONEY
DAVID H. MYERS
KENT R. SCHNACK
JOSEPH V. SIMANSKI
STANLEY J. STEK
GLENN S. VICIAN
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1977], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss3/5
